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RECENT DECISIONS
changes of possession there may be a symbolic delivery, e.g., a key,9
bills of lading,10 warehouse receipts," or other evidence of title.12
This hard and fast New York rule has not escaped severe criticism
from eminent writers 13 and the majority of our sister states 14 who
hold that acceptance by word or conduct, by a vendee in possession
under some prior and unrelated transaction, constitutes such an ac-
ceptance and receipt as contemplated by the statute.
On analysis, it appears that the New York rule more effectively
closes the door to the opportunities of fraud. If a buyer in possession
desired to secure the owner's property he could, by his own acts, show
an acceptance and satisfy the statute even though the owner had never
offered his goods for sale. Similarly could an owner of goods perjure
himself to the extent of saying that the buyer in possession had orally
or by conduct, accepted the goods thus effectuating a valid sale there-
of to the buyer who had never intended to purchase.15
With the preceding situations in mind, the New York courts
have limited the menacing possibilities of perjury and misunderstand-
ings-thus carrying out the avowed purpose of the Statute of Frauds.
H. G. V.
CORPORATION-SUBSCRIPTION AGREEMENTS-MARTIN ACT.-
The plaintiff entered into a subscription agreement with the defendant
corporation whereby the plaintiff subscribed to thirty units of the
'Wilkes v. Ferris, 5 Johns. 335 (N. Y. 1810) (key to warehouse where
goods were stored).
"Rodgers v. Phillips, 40 N. Y. 519 (1869).
'Whitlock v. Hay, 58 N. Y. 484 (1874).
" Jones v. Reynolds, 120 N. Y. 213, 24 N. E. 279 (1870) (on the oral sale
of an unpatented device acceptance of and receipt of a model thereof held suffi-
cient to satisfy the statute); see (1935) 20 CORN. L. Q. 226; 2 WxiisToN,
CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1936) § 559.
BROWNE, STATUTE OF FRAUDS (5th ed. 1895) § 322; BuRD cK, A STATUTE
FOR PROMOTING FRAUD (1916) 16 COL. L. REv. 273; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS
(1932) § 202, subd. (lb) Illus. 3; 2 WLISToN, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1936)
§ 554.
'Wilson v. Hotchkiss, 171 Cal. 617, 154 Pac. 1 (1915) ; Devine v. Warner,
75 Conn. 375, 53 Atl. 782 (1903); Raldne Realty Corp. v. Brooks, 281 Mass.
233, 183 N. E. 419 (1932); Kenesaw Mill & Elevator Co. v. Aufdenkamp, 106
Neb. 246, 183 N. W. 294 (1921); Moore v. State, 118 Okla. 69, 246 Pac. 404
(1926); Mack Co. v. Bear River Milling Co., 63 Utah 565, 227 Pac. 1033
(1924); Snider v. Thrall, 56 Wis. 674, 14 N. W. 814 (1883). For English
view see Edan v. Dudfield, 1 Q. B. Rep. 302 (1841).
' These examples are suggested from a close reading of the cases cited in
note 2, supra.
'This statute is New York's Blue Sky Law. Blue Sky Laws: Laws that
have been enacted for purpose of protecting the public "against the imposition
of unsubstantial schemes and the securities based upon them", deriving their
name from the fact that they are aimed at "speculative schemes which have no
more basis than so many feet of blue sky". BouviER's LAw DICTIONARY (Library
ed. 1928).
1938 ]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
stock of the defendant corporation and paid $1,000 on account. He
now brings this suit to recover this sum, predicating his action on the
defendant corporation's failure to comply with the provisions of Sec-
tion 359-e of Article 23-A of the General Business Law. These pro-
visions, popularly known as the Martin Act, impose penalties upon
those who sell securities to the general public without first filing the
notice required.2 The defendant corporation counterclaimed for the
unpaid balance due on the subscription agreement. Upon appeal from
a judgment in favor of plaintiff, held, reversed, complaint dismissed,
and judgment directed for defendant corporation on its counterclaim.
Contracts made in violation of the Martin Act are neither void nor
voidable, and are, therefore, enforceable. Sajor v. Ampol, Inc., 275
N. Y. 125, 9 N. E. (2d) 803 (1937).
The legality of contracts made in violation of the Martin Act is
the primary question answered on this appeal. The general rule, as
stated by Professor Fletcher,3 "is that a sale of stock or securities,
or an agreement for such sale, in violation of the Blue Sky Law, is
illegal and void, 4 although not expressly declared so by statute; 5 and
that the statute so expressly provides in some states." 6 The courts
of New York, however, take the position that the Martin Act must
'N. Y. GEN. Bus. LAW (1928) art. 23A, § 359e, subd. 1: "* * * no dealer
shall sell or offer for sale to the public within this state, as principal, broker or
agent, any securities issued or to be issued unless and until a notice, to be known
as the 'state notice,' containing the name, business or post office address of such
dealer and if such dealer is a corporation the state or county of incorporation
thereof, and if a partnership the names of the partners, shall have been filed
in the department of state." (Italics ours.)
Subd. 2: " * * * no dealer shall sell or offer for sale to public within this
state as principal, broker, or agent, or otherwise, any securities issued or to be
issued, unless and until such dealer shall have caused to be filed in the depart-
ment of law a statement, duly verified as hereinafter provided, to be known
as a 'dealer's statement'." (Italics ours.) The statement should in substance
contain: (1) name of the dealer, (2) address of dealer, (3) prior dealings in
securities, (4) any prior dealings in securities which resulted in a criminal
conviction.
' FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS (Rev. ed. 1932) § 6763.
Reilly v. Clyne, 24 Ariz. 432, 234 Pac. 35 (1925) ; Pollack v. Staunton,
210 Cal. 656, 293 Pac. 26 (1930) ; Felton v. Highlands Hotel Co., 165 Geo. 398,
141 S. E. 793 (1928) ; Stewart v. Brady, 310 IIl. 425, 133 N. E. 310 (1921) ;
Edward v. Ioor, 205 Mich. 617, 172 N. W. 620 (1919); Dixie Rubber Co. v.
Catohe, 145 Miss. 342, 110 So. 670 (1926) ; Schmidt v. Stortz, 208 Mo. App.
439, 236 S. W. 694 (1921); Rhines v. Skinner Packing Co., 128 Neb. 105,
187 N. W. 874 (1922) ; Biddle v. Smith, 148 Tenn. 489, 256 S. W. 453 (1923) ;
National Bank of Republic v. Price, 65 Utah 57, 234 Pac. 231 (1923) ; Creasy
Corp. v. Enz Bros. Co., 177 Wis. 49, 187 N. W. 666 (1922).
'Reilly v. Clyne, 24 Ariz. 432, 234 Pac. 35 (1925); Edward v. Ioor, 205
Mich. 617, 172 N. W. 620 (1919).
'Ala. Code (1928) c. 335, art. 12, §9899; Colo. Laws (1923) c. 168, §8;
Fla. Laws (1931) c. 14899, § 16; II. Laws (1919) pp. 351, 364, §37; Iowa
Code (1935) c. 393, cl. 8581-C18; Kan. Laws (1929) c. 140. § 18; Mich. Pub.
Acts (1923) No. 220. § 20; Mo. Laws (1929) pp. 347. 409, .25; N. D. Laws
(1923) c. 182. § 16; Okla. Laws (1931) art. 11, c. 24, § 16: Utah Laws (1925)
c. 87, § 18: Vt. Acts (1929) No. 93, § 17; Va. Acts (1928) c. 529, § 15; Wis.
Stats. c. 189, § 189.15.
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be enforced as written,7 and hold that contracts otherwise valid will
not be invalidated merely because of the failure to comply with the
Blue Sky Law.8  This literal interpretation is in line with the estab-
lished practice of the courts of this state.9 Consequently, the only
remedies available are those expressly provided for by Article 23-A
of the General Business Law. These remedies are punitive in the
sense that the wrongdoer is liable to criminal prosecution which, if
successful, carries with it a prison term of one year or a fine of $500,
or both,' 0 and preventive, in that the Attorney General is permitted
to obtain an injunction restraining either existing or threatened fraud-
ulent practices "1 as defined by the statute.' 2
As a result of this strict construction, violators of the statute are
permitted to retain the benefits of their extra-statutory dealings. Per-
haps this anomalous condition will be a blessing in disguise in that
it may operate to prompt our Legislature 13 to frame Blue Sky legis-
lation of a truly preventive nature.14
The question, whether a corporation which sells or offers to sell
Instant case at p. 131.
'Escalle v. Mark, 43 Nev. 172, 183 Pac. 387 (1919); Warren Peoples
Parket Co. v. Corbett, 114 Ohio St. 126, 151 N. E. 51 (1926); Waters v.
Homes Car, 163 Va. 114, 116 S. E. 366 (1923). (These cases follow our
interpretation of statutes.)
'Rosasco Creamery, Inc. v. Cohen, 276 N. Y. 274, 10 N. E. (2d) 55
(1937) ; Sajor v. Ampol, 275 N. Y. 125, 9 N. E. (2d) 803 (1937) ; Fosdick v.
Investors Syndicate, 266 N. Y. 130, 194 N. E. 58 (1934) ; Honig v. Riley, 244
N. Y. 105, 155 N. E. 65 (1926) ; Merchants Line v. B. & 0. R. R., 222 N. Y.
345, 118 N. E. 788 (1918); Mahar v. Harrington Park, 204 N. Y. 231, 97
N. E. 587 (1912); Allen v. Stevens, 161 N. Y. 122, 55 N. E. 568 (1899);
James v. Patten, 6 N. Y. 10 (1851).
'IN. Y. GEN. Bus. LAW (1936) art. 23A, § 359g. This section also pro-
vides that if any order issued under this section is disobeyed, it will constitute
contempt of court.
UN. Y. GEN. Bus. LAW (1921) art. 23A, § 353.
U N. Y. GEN. Bus. LAW (1921) art. 23A, § 352.
People v. Photocolor Corp., 156 Misc. 47, 281 N. Y. Supp. 130 (1935) (In
granting an injunction against a passive officer the court said that an injunction
will be granted "against one whether intending fraud or being negligent or
whether merely refusing to take affirmative action to prevent the violation; if
he is in a position to do so").
People v. Federated Radio Corp., 244 N. Y. 433, 154 N. E. 655 (1926)
(Held, that an innocent misrepresentation or nondisclosure is a fraudulent
practice within the meaning of this section).
U Mr. Justice Cardozo, writing for the court in Honig v. Riley, 244 N. Y.
105, 155 N. E. 65 (1926) said: "Those considerations are for the legislature.
They do not relieve us of duty of enforcing the laws as written."
" For a general discussion of the types of Blue Sky Laws, and their effect,
see PRASHICER, LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (1936) pp. 605-608 (and ma-
terial cited therein).
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its own stock to the public, 5 is a "dealer," 16 within the meaning of
the Martin Act was not answered by the court.'7 It should be noted,
however, that decisions under the Martin Act have generally tended
to favor the public.' 8 The decision in the instant case, explainable
on the grounds of statutory construction,19 is an apparent, rather than
a real deviation from this general policy. This policy, coupled with
an opinion handed down by the Attorney General,20 convinces the
writer that when this question is presented to the Court of Appeals,
it will probably be resolved in the affirmative.
B. B.
EVIDENCE-WIRE-TAPPING-STATUJTOPY CONSTRUCTION.-Peti-
tioners were convicted of smuggling alcohol largely upon evidence pro-
cured by the tapping of their telephone wires by federal officers. Such
tapping was done in the face of the Federal Communications Act '
which provided that "no person not being authorized by the sender
shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the contents
* * * of such intercepted communication to any person; * * *." On
appeal from a judgment affirming the conviction and approving the
admission of such evidence, held, reversed. The statute renders in-
'People v. Rutven, 160 Misc. '112, 288 N. Y. Supp. 631 (1936) (Held,
that the sale of stock by a corporation to its stockholders, who know that the
proceeds of such sale will be used for the purpose of continuing certain litiga-
tion, is not a sale to the public within the meaning of the Martin Act. By way
of dicta, it was also held that in the instant case the sale by the defendant
corporation was a sale to the public within the meaning of the Martin Act,
because it was willing to sell to anyone interested).
'IN. Y. GEN. Bus. LAW (1928) art. 23A, §359e describes a dealer as
"** * every person, partnership, corporation, * * * who engages * * * in the
business of trading in securities in such a manner that as part of such business
any of such securities are sold or offered for sale to the public in this state;
* * *. The business of trading in securities * * * shall not include an isolated
transaction in which a specific security is sold or offered for sale * *
(Italics ours.)
" Instant case at p. 130.
'S Dunham v. Ottinger, 243 N. Y. 423, 153 N. E. 298 (1926) (Upheld the
constitutionality of the Martin Act) ; In re Waldstein, 160 Misc. 763,
291 N. Y. Supp. 697 (1936). Held, that securities included any form of
instrument used for the purpose of financing and promoting enterprises. Cf.
People v. Federated Radio, 244 N. Y. 33, 154 N. E. 655 (1926). Held, that
crimes are not created by implication, and the act does not expressly prohibit
fraudulent practices; the statute merely provides a procedure to prevent them.
See notes 12, 15, supra.
a' See note 9, supra.
Corporation marketing its own securities direct to the public is itself a
dealer under the definition contained in the Martin Act. REP. ATr'Y GEN.
(1925) 187.
148 STAT. at L. 1069, 1103 (1934), 47 U. S. C. A. § 605.
